How I Almost Restarted the Korean War

By H. David Pendleton

Lenexa, KS



In late November 1983, I was serving as a Rifle Platoon Leader in B Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment in the 2nd Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea. Most of the 1/9 Infantry was stationed at Camp Greaves located north of the Imjin River and less than two miles from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) between North and South Korea. A Company, 1/9 Infantry was even further forward at Camp Liberty Bell, just outside the South Barrier fence. The border between the two countries is marked only by a series of MDL markers every 80 yards or so from one coast to the other. There is nothing that physically separates the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Each side has a fence located about 1,500 meters from the MDL line.

At that time, there were five infantry battalions assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division. Most were located at Camp Casey but all were south of the 1/9 Infantry whose nickname is the “Manchus” based on the 9th’s service in the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1904. “Warrior Base” was located between Camp Greaves and Camp Liberty Bell. It was the temporary home of one of the four other infantry battalions for ten weeks each year. During that ten weeks, the infantry battalion at Warrior Base served on the ‘DMZ Mission.” They would man the two Guard Posts in the American sector of the DMZ, have a quick reaction force (QRF) ready to assist in the Joint Security Area (JSA), and conduct patrols in the DMZ.

Since the 1/9 Infantry was forward all year round, they drew the DMZ mission for not ten weeks but twelve weeks every year. The Manchus would spend the months of December, January, and February each year on the DMZ mission. Each month, one of the line companies (A,B, and C) would perform one of the missions and then rotate to one of the other missions. B Company’s rotation would be guard post duty followed by QRF and then patrolling.

The QRF assignment required that one platoon was on ten minutes notification with the entire company on sixty minutes notification to deploy into the JSA.

The patrolling mission consisted of the company conducting three daylight reconnaissance patrols each day followed by three night combat patrols. The battalion’s scout platoon also conducted their own recon and combat patrols. During the combat patrols, the patrol would set up an ambush site and remain in it for about two hours waiting for any DPRK infiltrators. Each platoon had three squads and every squad had to have a staff sergeant or above leading it. The platoon was on a three-day cycle of daylight patrol, night ambush, and rest day. Each squad performed about ten missions, the minimum requirement to earn the Imjin Warrior badge.

In November 1983, the B Company Commander had the three line platoon leaders learn the script that was used by the guard post commander to brief VIPs that visited Guard Post Ouellette, located less than ten yards from the MDL. Evidently, being able to brief the VIPs was a very important part of being the GP Ouellette commander. Besides his own platoon, the GP Ouelette Commander would also have attachments under his command including snipers from the Scout platoon, forward observers from the supporting artillery battalion, ground surveillance radar (GSR) personnel that worked at night, and even a cook. The total number was about sixty personnel. The best part of the job was that the company commander rarely visited the guard posts after the first few days if all was going well.

I do not know the reason or reasons, but the B company commander selected me to be the GP Oullette commander. The platoon leader that finished second in the competition became the commander of GP Collier located further west and a little further back from the MDL. The third platoon and the mortar platoon provided logistical support to the two front line platoons.

Beginning the night of 29/30 November 1983, one-third of my platoon along with my platoon sergeant and I arrived at GP Oulette and began to replace the previous unit. The next night, another one-third of my platoon arrived. By daylight on 2 December 1983, I was now the GP Oullette Commander and everyone reported to me. The operations security was not too good as just after dark, the North Korean loudspeakers began to blare, “Welcome Manchus” and other English phrases indicating that they knew that a switch had been made on the line.

Everyone on both guard posts had live ammunition but only for M-16s. No machine guns were allowed in the DMZ based on the 1953 armistice. The rules of engagement (ROE) were strict. We could only fire in self defense or if approved to fire from the battalion commander.

The rumors were that the North Korean special operations forces used the U.S. sector of the DMZ as a final test for their candidates—primarily as the Americans did not shoot as fast as the ROK soldiers due to our strict ROE. At night, the DPRK soldiers would cross the MDL southeast of GP Ouellette and move about 2,000 meters behind us and then cross in front of GP Collier before crossing back into the DPRK over the MDL line. By the time the Americans spotted the DPRK and notified the battalion commander, it was usually too late to fire.

The 2nd Platoon, B Company, 1/9 Infantry brought a new special weapon with them when they came to GP Ouellette. The previous month, we received new night vision sights for the Dragon anti-tank weapon. We did not bring our Dragons with us but we did bring all our sights and the batteries that operated them.

We operated three shifts at GP Oullette with each squad taking eight hours plus time for the changeover. Only four of the bunkers on the hill were manned most of the time. During stand-to in the morning and stand-down in the evening, all personnel manned all the bunkers for about thirty minutes. Each week, we planned to rotate the squads so that the same squad did not receive the graveyard shift for the entire month.

The first full day I was in charge, 2 December 1983, was a night I will never forget. Our plan was that my platoon sergeant would work a 16-hour shift covering the darkness while I worked a 16-hour shift covering the daylight. This would allow me to escort VIPs around as they did not show up after dark. My platoon sergeant woke me about 0200 hours. He told me that one our Soldiers had spotted figures on the night vision sight. My platoon sergeant verified that there were indeed people there and they were not Americans as we had all ambush routes on a map in our operations area.

I immediately contacted the battalion command post (CP) at Camp Greaves and it just so happened that the battalion commander was there. He had just inspected one of the ambush patrols and had stopped in at the battalion CP. Before going on a patrol, one of the field grade officers—commander, executive officer, or operations officer—needed to inspect each patrol just before they departed.

The battalion commander contacted the scout platoon that he had just sent out and we vectored them in to intercept the unknown element crossing behind GP Ouellette. The Combat Support Company (CS) happened to be in the truck when the scout platoon received the change of mission and he went with them on it to direct them personally.  At about two hundred yards, the snipers opened fire on the group of at least seven unknowns. They also hit them with M-203 high explosive rounds.

After about thirty minutes of firing, the Scout platoon had to send a couple of runners to obtain more M-203 ammunition from GP Collier as they were closer to the action. VIII Army policy at the time was not to get too close to any of the bodies because they might be booby trapped and to wait until daylight. This policy led to unintended consequences.

After the firefight began, all the lights on the DPRK side of the line began to flash assorted colors—red, blue, green, orange, and yellow. The propaganda speakers switched from what they normally played to other music and sentences. With our Dragon night sights, my Soldiers could make out that there was at least seven unknowns—two groups of three with one more going between the group. We also noticed more figures coming over the DML to our southeast.

In the early morning hours, the batteries on our Dragon night sights began to die out. They would take several hours to recharge. Thus, those of us at GP Oullette were blind to the actions about 1,000 meters away from us. About the same time, the batteries in the night vision scopes of the snipers in the scout platoon began to fade as they were only good for a couple of hours at the time. Since it was the first night for the battalion, the snipers did not carry extra batteries with them.

We noticed that a hill, very similar to GP Ouellette’s, on the other side of the DML was flashing green signals with a flash light. One of our Soldiers started doing the same. We noticed a figure crawling towards our hill. He got about 100 yards away before he figured out he was going in the wrong direction. The unknown figure then veered off towards the other green light.

Just before sunrise, there was enough light for the scout platoon to close the 200-yard gap to where the unknowns had gone to ground. They found blood on the ground and drag marks but no bodies. The bodies had been dragged into an area marked on our maps as a “no go zone” because of “unexploded ordnance” and none of our patrols ever went into this area that was about two hundred yards by two hundred yards square right on the DML.

The next day, my company commander and battalion commander arrived. My platoon sergeant led a patrol out to the area where the unknown figures had been hit. They also then went into the “no go zone” and found that the unexploded ordnance was some type of container dropped from an aircraft. It was small enough that my platoon sergeant was able to carry it back to GP Ouellette on his shoulder.

That week I had other visitors. The first was the brigade commander, COL Stack. He was infamous for his “Stack attacks” where his helicopter would land at a subordinate unit’s training area and he would go off on them. I only had two encounters with him and never received a dressing down. He was cordial and asked questions about the incident. The next day’s visitor was Major General (MG) Henry Doctor, Jr. He was the 2nd Infantry Division commander. Again, there was no issues as we had our “ducks in a row.” The last visitor was the XVIII Commander. I cannot remember his name and could not find it on the Internet. I do remember that he jokingly asked if I was trying to start a war.

After this incident, our battalion commander instituted several policy changes. First, the snipers in the Scout patrol carried two extra batteries each so they could be good for over six hours of use at night. Second, the battalion fabricated several grappling hooks with ropes attached. The next time, he planned for our Soldiers to go immediately to the bodies using the hooks and ropes to turn them over in case of booby traps. Third, the battalion commander directed that all the company’s Dragon night vision batteries be evenly split between the two guard posts. It was to no avail as the DPRK soldiers never tested 1/9 Infantry for the remaining three months while manning the guard posts in the DMZ.

Each year when December 2 comes around, I think back to my much younger days when I almost restarted a shooting war on the Korean peninsula. Luckily, cooler heads prevailed on both sides of the DMZ.